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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MATOUMBA v. STATE: A POLICE OFFICER IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO BE QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 
TO TESTIFY IN A SUPPRESSION HEARING REGARDING 
FACTS THAT GAVE RISE TO A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
JUSTIFYING A STOP AND FRISK OF A SUSPECT 
By: Nancy Chung 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a police officer is not 
required to be qualified as an expert witness in a suppression hearing 
regarding facts that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a 
stop and frisk of a suspect. Matoumba v. State, 390 Md. 544, 890 
A.2d 288 (2006). In so holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that a trial court has broad discretion in declining to use the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence when determining preliminary questions 
dealing with the admissibility of evidence. 
Lieutenant Palmero ("Palmero") of the Baltimore City Firearms 
Apprehension Strike Team and Officer Moynihan ("Moynihan") of the 
Tactical Quick Response Team stopped a vehicle for speeding, in 
which Kobie Matoumba ("Matoumba") was a passenger. Based on his 
observations of Matoumba, Moynihan ordered Matoumba out of the 
car and frisked him. Moynihan found a handgun in Matoumba's back 
pocket. 
Matoumba was charged with possession of a handgun by a person 
previously convicted of a crime of violence. At Matoumba's hearing 
on his motion to suppress, both Moynihan and Palmero were 
questioned about their belief that Matoumba was armed, but neither 
was qualified as an expert. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City held 
that the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk 
Matoumba and accepted the testimony of both officers. Matoumba 
waived his right to a jury, pled not guilty and proceeded on an agreed 
statement of facts. He was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory 
term of five years in prison without parole. 
Matoumba appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
which affirmed the ruling. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to consider "whether a police officer is required to be 
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qualified as an expert when testifying at a suppression hearing as to his 
or her basis for conducting a frisk." 
In affirming the Court of Special Appeals' decision, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland rejected Matoumba's argument that Maryland 
Rule 5-701 or Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), 
mandated that a police officer be qualified as an expert in order to 
render an opinion on his or her basis for reasonable articulable 
suspicion to conduct a frisk. !d. at *2. 
Matoumba relied on the holding in Ragland v. State, stating 
Maryland Rules 5-701 and 5-702 "prohibit the admission as 'lay 
opinion' of testimony based upon specialized knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education." Id. (quoting Ragland v. State, 385 
Md. 706, 725, 870 A.2d 609, 620 (2005)). The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland distinguished Ragland from the case at bar by reasoning that 
Ragland was directed to trial proceedings, and not pretrial proceedings 
such as suppression hearings. Id. at *2. The Court refused to extend 
Ragland to include suppression hearings. Id. 
Rule 5-101(b)(12) states that the Maryland Rules of Evidence do 
not apply to "[a ]ny other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of 
the rules in this Title, the court was traditionally not bound by the 
common-law rules of evidence." Id. at *3 (quoting MD. R. EVID. 5-
101(b)(12)). In interpreting this rule, the Court determined that the 
rules are inapplicable to suppression proceedings because the 
common-law rules of evidence were not applied to such proceedings 
before the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Id. at *4. 
Furthermore, the Court relied on Rule 5-10 1 (c)(1) which grants the 
court discretion to decline to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence 
pursuant to Rule 5-104(a). Id. at *5. Rule 5-105(a) of the Maryland 
Rules of Evidence provides that "[p ]reliminary questions concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by 
the court." Id. at *3 (quoting MD. R. EVID. 5-105(a)). Therefore, the 
Court concluded that because suppression hearings involve 
determining preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of 
evidence, the trial court has broad discretion to decline to strictly apply 
the Rules of Evidence. Id. at *4. 
The Court rejected Matoumba's argument that the issue here dealt 
with the competency of a witness, which would mandate the 
application of the Rules of Evidence in suppression hearings. Id. at *5. 
The Court determined that Matoumba was mistaken as to the meaning 
of "competency" as used in Rules 5-10 1 and 5-104. Id. The Court 
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reasoned that the Rules refer to the traditional notion of competency, 
meaning "that the witness has sufficient mental capacity to understand 
the nature and obligation of an oath and is possessed of sufficient mind 
and memory to observe, recollect, and narrate the things he or she has 
seen or heard." Id. The "competency" of an expert witness to testify 
and the witness' possession of knowledge sufficient to allow him or 
her to testify on a specific matter were not contemplated in the Rules. 
Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that based on this analysis, 
the police officers were not required to be qualified as expert 
witnesses before testifying at a suppression hearing as to the reasons 
for Matoumba's frisk. /d. In addition, the Court held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strictly apply the Rules 
of Evidence. Id. 
In so holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted trial courts 
broad discretion to decline to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence in 
determining preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of 
evidence in a suppression hearing. This ruling may create a problem 
to judicial efficiency, for the same issues regarding admissibility of 
evidence may reoccur at the actual trial in which the Rules of 
Evidence will have to be strictly applied. Nonetheless, the Court was 
adhering to the Rules of Evidence in its ruling. The Rules of Evidence 
may have to be reexamined to require the application of the rules to 
preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence to 
prevent the problem. Moreover, the rules should define "competency" 
so that lay persons like Matoumba will not be mistaken as to its 
meaning. Perhaps, the better word to describe what the rule meant by 
"competency" is "capacity." 
